

# Analysis of Networked Automation Systems

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Juniorprofessur Agentenbasierte Automatisierung

JPA<sup>2</sup>

**JPA<sup>2</sup> Group at University of Kaiserslautern: People**

UnB

*Juniorprofessur Agentenbasierte Automatisierung - Windows Internet Explorer*

Juniorprofessur Agentenbasierte Automatisierung J. Prof. Dr.-Ing. Georg Frey

Juniorprofessur Agentenbasierte Automatisierung J. Prof. Dr.-Ing. Georg Frey

Die Juniorprofessur JPA<sup>2</sup> (gegr. 15. Sept. 2002) gehört zum Fachbereich Elektro- und Informationstechnik der Technischen Universität Kaiserslautern.

Der Schwerpunkt unserer Forschung liegt auf der Entwicklung von Methoden zur Bereitstellung verlässlicher (verteilter) Automatisierungssysteme. Verlässlichkeit im Sinne des Vertrauens in die Funktion des Systems kann dabei auf zwei Wegen erreicht werden: Durch transparente, nachvollziehbare Entwicklungsmethoden sowie durch umfangreiche Analyse des entwickelten Systems. Beide Ansätze werden in unseren Forschungsarbeiten untersucht.

EIT R

The Juniorprofessorship Agentbased Automation JPA<sup>2</sup> (founded Sept. 15, 2002) is part of the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Kaiserslautern.

The focus of our research is the development of methods for the design of dependable (distributed) automation systems. Dependability in the sense of the trustworthiness of a system can be reached by two approaches: transparent development processes and detailed analysis. Both approaches are studied in our research.

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Technische Universität Kaiserslautern

J. Prof. Dr.-Ing. Georg Frey JPA<sup>2</sup>

2

- Design of Distributed Automation Systems
  - Development Processes based on UML
  - Object-Oriented Automation O<sup>2</sup>A
  - Design based on IEC 61499
  - Implementation on Networked Devices
  - Object Oriented Simulation of Automation Systems (SIL, HIL)
  - Functionality Based Design using Automation Objects
  
- **Analysis of Networked Automation Systems**
  - **Simulation**
    - discrete
    - continuous
  - **Model Checking**
    - timed
    - probabilistic

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- Motivation
  - Future Directions in Control
  - Networked Automation Systems, NAS
- Analysis of NAS
  - Correctness Notions for NAS
  - Aim of the Analysis: Dependability
- Multi Model Multi Method Approach M<sup>4</sup>
- Introductory Example
- Analysis by Simulation
  - discrete event
  - hybrid
- Analysis by Model-Checking
  - timed
  - probabilistic
- Summary and Outlook

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## Convergence of C<sup>3</sup>-Technologies

### Conclusions

... The growing synergy between communications, computation and control was noted and it is clear that evolving network technology poses major opportunities and challenges to control theory and methodologies. Questions about the convergence of C<sup>3</sup> technologies (control, computing and communications) lead today to similar questions about the convergence of disciplines ...”

[Report on the WORKSHOP ON FUTURE AND EMERGING CONTROL SYSTEMS Organized by Unit E1 Essential Technologies and Infrastructures IST Program European Commission (2000)]

### Recommendations

... the Panel developed a list of five major recommendations for accelerating the impact of control.

#### 1. Integrated Control, Computation, Communications


...

Substantially increase research aimed at the *integration* of control, computer science, communications, and networking.


[„Future Directions in Control, Dynamics, and Systems - Control in an Information Rich World“ Report of the Panel on Future Directions in Control, Dynamics, and Systems (NSF, 2002)]

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
### Classic closed loop





### Networked Automation System



### Classic distributed control



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## Dependability

- includes safety, reliability, quality, tolerance, robustness, availability, (security), ...
- e.g.: part rejection rate, reaction on an event in a given time interval
- is influenced by: HW-failures, SW-errors, delays by HW-SW-system, failures in the network, delays by the network
- described by „value-“ and „time-based“ properties

*Will the system respond to an input change with the permissible output change?*

*"A signal change at input A will be followed by the activation of output 5."*

*Will the system do so within the permissible time bounds?*

*"A signal change at input A will be followed by the activation of output 5 within 50ms."*

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### Time based properties (related to dependability)

Will the system respond to an input change in the permissible time?

- Safety (maximum and minimum {delay} times), e.g. earliest opening of a safty clamp.
- Reliability (Probability of reacting within a given time frame)
- Quality (Distribution of values to be processed)
- Differences, distances, conservation of (original) order

Classical system verification uses hard bounds = worst case analysis

➔ often infeasible in NAS (especially if failures are considered)!

*"A change in a sensor value which stays active only for a time interval (pulse) of 5 ms is detected by the controller in all cases."*




*A change in a sensor value that stays active only for a time interval (pulse) of 5 ms is detected by the controller in 99% of all cases.*

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

- Known Approaches (e.g. Network Calculus) deliver only extremal values
- In NAS the Distribution of Response Time is of Interest (Quality, Safety)
- Ways to Analyze the Response Times in NAS
  - Simulation
    - Only Control Part (Reaction on Input) → timed discrete event model model  
→ [HCTPN Simulation in CPN-Tools \(finished project, Dissertation in 2006\)](#)
    - Closed Loop → Hybrid Model  
→ Algorithms + DEs in [Modelica-Language Simulation in Dymola \(running project started 2007\)](#)
  - Formal Verification
    - Control under normal conditions → timed discrete event model  
→ [Timed Automata \(TA\) and Verification in Uppaal \(study completed\)](#)
    - Control considering failures and distributions → probabilistic timed discrete event model  
→ [Discrete Time Markov Chains and Verification in PRISM using Probabilistic Model Checking, PMC \(running project, Dissertation in 2007\)](#)

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## Introductory Example



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## Lesson learned from the Example


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- In NAS there is an Overlay of asynchronous cyclic processes
- Response time depends on the state of the system at the time an event occurs
- Good coverage of possible states is important to get useful results
- Two approaches:
  1. Analyzing the system for a long time with stochastic input events
  2. Analyzing the system for stochastic initial states with fixed input event



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## HCTPN Approach: System Model as Abstract Petri Net

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## Modelica Approach: Modeling

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

- Process Model built from continuous Modelica Blocks (DEs)
- Control part embedded into algorithm blocks including execution models
  - cyclic (PLC-Model)
  - Event-Based (embedded controllers)
- Network as algorithm models
  - Messages are represented as tokens in the model (ID number)
  - Network delays the tokens
    - Storage in Switches
    - Delay on wires
  - Content (data) of the message is kept in a database externally and read if needed

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

## Modelica Approach: Comparative Example



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- PLC: 10ms
- PLC-I/O: 17ms
- Field-I/O: 2ms



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## Pros

- Formal Verification: All cases are covered

## Cons

- Model not intuitive
- Verification is very time-consuming
- Formulation of properties is hard
- Integration of continuous dynamics is not possible
- Integration of probabilistic behavior is also not possible

## Application

- Proof of special important properties (assumptions in the simulation approaches)
- Verification of reduced (conservative) Models (Reduction based on Simulation)

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## System immanent Reasons:

- Models of NAS often show probabilistic Behavior (Example: Network Delays)
- Exact Analysis Results (Worst-Case-Analyses) then lead to infeasible Demands on the System



## Application Reasons:

- Number of safety critical Automation Systems increases
- Modeling of Failures (stochastic) is important part of the analysis

## Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) Approach:



1. Properties with probabilistic bounds (PCTL)
2. Modeling with Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA) and Mapping to embedded discrete-time Markov Chains (DTMC)

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## PMC Approach: Models of PLC and Network (cont. PTA)

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
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## PMC Approach: Models of the Network with Failure (disc. PTA)


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$p_{Down} = 0,001$  (MTBF = 1000 ms, Discretization Step = 1 ms)  
Downtime = 51 ms  
SwMax = 5 ms



### Failure





### Network




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## PMC Approach: Delay times with failures

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




→ With a probability of 99.8% the delay will be less than 20ms

## PMC Approach: Influence of Distributed Calculation

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
- Distributing an algorithm on several PLCs





- Example: 3 PLCs working in an NAS (all accessing the same I/O-board)
  - Network: Delay directly caused by the network
  - Access-Conflicts: Delays caused when several PLCs try to access the same I/O-board
  - Synchronization: Delays caused when a process has to wait for another (e.g. PLC waits for input from PLC-I/O)
  - Execution: Time spent on execution of algorithms in PLCs and I/O-boards
- results are found to be similar for other configurations

### Access-Conflicts



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#### Pros

- Verification Approach → Completeness
- Only approach allowing the direct modeling of probabilities
- Check of probabilistic properties is possible
- Reliability could be checked

#### Cons

- Complicated Modeling (Esp. Initial and Terminal conditions)
- Computationally Expensive
- Currently some problems with stability in PRISM

#### Application

- Proof of probabilistic Properties
- Analysis of Systems with Failures

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### General


- ④ Convergence of C<sup>3</sup>-Technologies Control, Computation und Communication leads to Networked Automation Systems (NAS)
- ④ NAS pose new challenges for dependability Analysis
- ④ Depending on the Application different methods to analyze „temporal correctness“ can be used
  - ④ Simulation (discrete): Fast open-loop, however no completeness guarantee
  - ④ Simulation (hybrid): Transparent, closed-loop → Application to NCS possible
  - ④ Verification (deterministic): Only in restricted cases
  - ④ Verification (probabilistic): Open-loop, Safety, Completeness Guarantee

### Analysis Results

- ④ Network delays are of minor influence in NAS (10%)
- ④ However, network allows the structures that lead to high delays by synchronization and resource sharing (50%)
- ④ Failures lead to extremely high response times with extremely low probability  
→ probabilistic bounds are needed in analysis

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- Consideration of complex control algorithms into analysis
- Integration of different methods in one framework
- Automated design process for PMC



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# Thank You